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Abstract — security to the data is actually provided
by an authentication. Authentication involves a process
of confirming an identity. In Wireless sensor networks a
lot of message authentication schemes have been
developed, based on symmetric-key cryptosystems or
public-key cryptosystems. Message authentication is one
of the most effective way to prevent illegal and tainted
messages from being forwarded in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs). For this cause, Most of them,
however, have the limitations of high computational and
communication overhead in addition to lack of
scalability and pliability to node compromise attacks. To
address these issues, a Polynomial-based scheme was
recently introduced. Though, this scheme and its
extensions all have the flaw of a built-in Threshold
determined by the degree of the polynomial: when the
number of messages transmitted is larger than this
threshold, the adversary can fully recover the
polynomial. In this paper, we suggest a scalable
authentication scheme based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) with Schnorr Signcryption. While
enabling intermediate nodes authentication, our proposed
scheme solve the threshold problem. In addition, our
scheme can also provide message source privacy. Both
theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate
that our proposed scheme is efficient than the
polynomial-based approach in terms of computational
and communication overhead under comparable security
levels.
Keywords — Hop-by-hop authentication, symmetric-
key cryptosystem, public-key cryptosystem, source
privacy, simulation, wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
distributed algorithm, decentralized control
1. Introduction
Now a Days message authentication plays a key role
to prevent the illegal and tainted messages from being
forwarded in wireless sensor networks to save the sensor
energy. for this reason Various authentication schemes
have been developed to give message authenticity and
integrity verification for wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) [1], [2]. These schemes can mainly be alienated
into two categories: public-key based approaches and
symmetric-key based approaches very hard to meet also
the requirements of complex key management, system
usability, resilience and scalability.
An intruder can compromise the key by capturing a
single sensor node. In addition, this method does not
work in multicast networks. To solve the scalability
problem, a secret polynomial based message
authentication scheme was introduced in [3]. The
thought of this scheme is alike to a threshold secret
sharing, where the threshold is determined by the degree
of the polynomial. This approach offers information-
theoretic security of the shared secret key when the
number of messages larger than the threshold. The
middle nodes confirm the authenticity of the message
through a polynomial assessment. However, when the
number of messages larger than the threshold, the
polynomial can be fully recovered and the system is
totally broken.
We suggested a categorically safe and well-organized
source anonymous message authenti-cation (SAMA)
scheme based on the schnorr signature on elliptic curves.
This scheme is safe next to adaptive chosen message
attacks in this model [10].Our system allows the
intermediate nodes to validate the message so that all
tainted message can be notice and fall to preserve the
sensor power. While attain flexible-time authentication
compromise resiliency, and source identity protection,
our scheme does not have the threshold problem. Both
theoretical analysis and simulation results show that our
proposed scheme is well-organized than the polynomial-
based algorithm under the comparable security levels.
The major contributions of this proposal are the
following:
1. We build up a source anonymous message
authentication code (SAMAC) on elliptic curves that can
offer unqualified source secrecy.
2. We propose a well-organized hop-by-hop message
authentication Mechanism for WSNs without the doorsill
limitation.
3. We sketch network implementation code on source
node solitude protection in WSNs.
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4. We recommend an efficient key management
framework to make sure isolation of the compromised
nodes.
5. We supply widespread simulation results under
the Technologies on numerous security levels.
Figure 1 Anonymous set selection in active routing
This is the primary system that gives hop-by-hop
node verification without the threshold curb, and has
recital better than the symmetric-key based schemes. The
dispersed nature of our algorithm creates the scheme
appropriate for decentralized networks.
2. PRIMITIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we will briefly describe the
terminology and the cryptographic techniques that will
be used.
Threat Model and Assumptions
We suppose that each sensor node knows its relative
site in the sensor area and is able of communicating with
its adjacent nodes in a straight line by geographic
routing. The entire network is completely connected
before outsourcing from side to side multi-hop
communications. We take for granted there is a security
server (SS) that is accountable for generation, storage
and sharing of the safety limit among the network. The
compromised nodes will not be clever to make new
public keys that can be conventional by the SS and other
nodes. Based on the on top of assumptions, this paper
considers two types of attacks open by the adversaries:
Passive attacks and active attacks. During passive
attacks, the opponent could listen in on messages
transmitted in the network and carry out traffic analysis.
Active attacks can only be start on from the
compromised sensor nodes. Once the sensor nodes are
compromised, the adversaries will find all the
information stored in the compromised nodes, with the
safety parameters of the compromised nodes.
Design Goals:
Message authentication. The message receiver
should be capable to authenticate whether a received
message is sent by the node that is claimed or by a node
in a finicky group. In other words, the adversaries cannot
imaginary to be an innocent node and introduce fake
messages into the network without being noticed.
Message integrity. The message receiver should be
able to bear out whether the message has been modified-
route by the adversaries. In other words, the adversaries
cannot change the message content without being
detected.
Hop-by-hop message authentication. Each
forwarder on the routing path should be talented to bear
out the legitimacy and truth of the messages upon
response.
Identity and location privacy. The adversaries
cannot settle on the message sender’s ID and location by
investigate the message contents or the local traffic.
Node compromise resilience. No topic how many
nodes are compromised, the residual nodes can still is
safe Efficiency. The scheme should be well-organized in
terms of both computational and communication
overhead.
Terminology
Privacy is now and then referred to as obscurity.
Communication mystery in information management has
been discussed in a number of preceding works.
Unidentifiable within a set of subjects. This set is
called the AS. Sender anonymity means that a
meticulous message is not linkable to any sender, and no
message is linkable to a exacting sender. We will
establish with the explanation of the categorically
protected SAMA.
Algorithm 1 (SAMA). A SAMA consists of the
following two algorithms:
Generate (m;Q1,Q2, . … .,Qn). Given a message m
and the public keys Q1,Q2, ... .,Qn of the AS
S ={A1,A2, . . …,An}, the actual message sender At;
1 < t < n, produces an anonymous message S(m)  using
its own private key dt.
Verify S(m). Given a message m and an anonymous
message S(m), which includes the public keys of all
members in the AS, a verifier can determine whether
S(m)is generated by a member in the AS.
The security requirements for SAMA include:
Sender ambiguity. The probability that a verifier
successfully determines the real sender of the
anonymous message is exactly 1=n, where n is the total
number of members in the AS.
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Unforgeability. An anonymous message scheme is
unforgeable if no adversary, given the public keys of all
members of the AS and the anonymous messages
m1,m2,. . .,mn adaptively chosen by the adversary, can
produce in polynomial time a new valid anonymous
message with non-negligible probability.
In this implementation, the user ID and the user
public key will be used interchangeably without making
any distinctions.
Algorithm 2: Implementation of the New
Signcryption Scheme:
Schnorr signcryption scheme  produced by the
Schnorr signature algorithm[10][11] . it consist of three
steps.
Choose parameters:
P: a large prime, q:a prime factor of P-1 and g:is a
generator Zp* i.e)chosen from integers in [1,…..,p-1]
with order q modulo p.
1,Key generation step.
Alice Private key: a number xa drawn randomly
from[1,…..,q-1]
Alice Public key : ya =g -xa mod p.
2.Signcryption step:
Schnorr suggests that Alice sign a digital document
as M, by picking a random from k from[1,…,q-1].and r
= gk mod p.
Let e=h(M||r) where || denotes concatenation and r is
represented as a bit string. H is a cryptographic hash
function . h:{0,1}* Zp
Let  s=k+xae mod q.
The signature is the pair(e,s)
3.Unsigncryption step:
The procedure for other people to verify alice
signature (e,s) on M is straightforward: checking
whether
ev= h(gs.yae mod p||M)
then ev=h(M||rv)
If ev=e the signcryption is verified and accepted.if it
is not equal then reject.
If alice publishes ya=gxa mod p, instead of ya=g-xa
mod p, then s can be defined as s=k-xa.e mod q,
signature verification is same.
Key management and Node Detection
In our scheme, we assume that there is an SS whose
everyday jobs take in public-key storage and distribution
in the WSNs. We presume that the SS will by no means
be compromised. However, after operation, the sensor
node may be detain and compromised by the attackers.
Once compromised, all information stored in the sensor
node will be available to the attackers. We added assume
that the compromised node will not be bright to form
new public keys that can be customary by the SS. For
competence, each public key will have a short
uniqueness. The length of the distinctiveness is based on
the scale of the WSNs.
As the SAMA system assurance that the message
honesty is untampered, when a bad or empty message is
conventional by the sink node, the source node is sight
as cooperation. If the compromised source node only
broadcast one message, it would be very hard for the
node to be recognized without extra network traffic
information.
If the compromised nodes repetitively use the same
AS, it makes transfer examination of the compromised
nodes reasonable, which will enlarge the likelihood for
the compromised nodes to be notorious and captured.
When a node has been identified as conciliation, the SS
can eliminate its public key from its public key list. It
can also screen the node’s short characteristics to the
entire sensor domain so that any sensor node that uses
the stored public key for an AS selection can keep posted
its key list. Once the public key of a node has been
detached from the public key list, and/or broadcasted,
any message with the AS hold the compromised node
should be fall without any procedure in arrange to put
aside the valuable sensor power.
3. RELATED WORK
In [1], [2], symmetric key and hash based
authentication, schemes were proposed for WSNs. each
symmetric authentication key is shared by a group of
sensor nodes. An intruder can compromise the key by
capturing a single sensor node. Therefore, these schemes
are not resilient to node compromise attacks. To address
these issues a secret polynomial based message
Authentication scheme was introduced in [3]. This idea
offers information-theoretic defense with ideas
analogous to a threshold secret sharing, where the
threshold is resolute by the degree of the polynomial.
When the number of messages transmitted is below
threshold, the scheme enable the intermediate node to
confirm the genuineness of the message through
polynomial evaluation. On the other hand, when the
number of messages transmitted is larger than the
threshold, the polynomial can be entirely recovered and
the system is totally broken. To add to the threshold and
the difficulty for the intruder to rebuild the secret
polynomial, random noise, also called a perturbation
factor, was added to the polynomial in [4] to frustrate the
adversary from calculate the coefficient of the
polynomial. Though, the added perturbation factor can
be wholly detached using error-correcting code
techniques [6]. For the public-key based approach, each
message is transmitted along with the digital signature of
the message generated by using the sender’s private key.
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4. PROPOSED  MESSAGE
AUTHENTICATION  ON ELLIPTIC CURVES
We recommend a categorically safe and efficient
SAMA. The major thought is that for each message m to
be released, the message sender, or the sending node,
generates a basis anonymous message authenticator for
the message m. The generation is based on the Schonnr
signcryption scheme on elliptic curves. For a ring
signature, each ring member is required to compute a
signature for all other members in the AS. In our format,
the entire SAMA to be verified through single equation
with out individually verifying the signature
Proposed Schonnr signcryption Scheme on
Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E is defined by an equation of the
form: E: y2=x3+ax+b mod p
Where a,b ϵ Fp. The set E(Fp)  consists of all points
(x,y) ϵ Fp on the Curve, to gather with a Special point O,
called the point at infinity.
Let p be the point on the E(Fp) . Alice can select a
random integer daϵ[1,N-1] as his private key. Then he
can compute his public key Qa from Qa=da*p.
Signature generation step: Alice to sign the message
m,[from algorithm2 signcryption step is applied] the
signature pair(e,s) is generated then it can be transferred.
Signature verification step: for Bob to authenticate
alice’s signature, then he must have copy the public key
Qa and checks that Qa is lies on the curve or not. Then
only he should verify the signature.[from algorithm 2
unsigncryption step is applied] the signature is valid
based on the verification step, then accepts otherwise
rejects.
Proposed SAMA Scheme on Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E is defined by an equation of the
form: E: y2=x3+ax+b mod p.
Where a,b ϵ Fp. The set E(Fp)  consists of all points
(x,y) ϵ Fp on the Curve.
Authentication generation [from algorithm1
generation step] then produces a anonymous message
S(m) is transferred to different nodes.
Verification step: Bob to verify an alleged SAMA of
S(m) , he must have a copy of the public keys Q1,
Q2 ….....,Qn. Then he checks Qi ,i=1,…,n lies on the
curve or not . Then only he should verify the
signature.[from algorithm 2 verification step is
applied]the message is valid based on the verification
step then accepts otherwise rejects.
Performance analysis step based on theoretical
analysis we will evaluate our proposed schonnr
signcryption  scheme with the MES described in [10],
[11] the computational cost is less in Schonnr
signcryption when compare to MES. A fair comparison
between them is shown [11].
5. CONCLUSION
We projected a novel and efficient SAMA based on
ECC. Even as make sure message sender privacy,
SAMA can be practical to any message to provide
message content authenticity. To provide hop-by-hop
message authentication without the weak spot of the
built-in threshold of the bivariate polynomial-based
scheme, we then planned a hop-by-hop message
authentication scheme based on the SAMA and Schnorr
signcryption. When practical to WSNs with fixed sink
nodes, we also converse possible practice for
compromised node discovery. Both theoretical and
simulation results show that, in similar scenarios, our
proposed system is more well-organized than the
bivariate polynomial based scheme and MES in terms of
computational cost and communication overhead,
message delay energy consumption, delivery ratio, and
memory use. the following task seem interesting in
future research: Designing schemes to support dynamic
group member management in the sense that group
member can join or leave the group efficiently and
dynamically.
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